Panhellenism: A Brief History

The period between the Persian Wars and the death of Alexander saw the emergence of “panhellenism”, the notion that the Greeks could come together to form one body with a common purpose and cause. Panhellenism was certainly a driving force during this period, where it was used as a way to organize a defence against a common foe, or as a justification by certain city-states and regimes to advance their imperial agendas. Moreover, the ideology of panhellenism was closely intertwined with anti-Persian rhetoric, and its success was limited to the prevalence of the perceived external threat posed by Persia. 

Panhellenism truly took shape during the Persian Wars. This was seen as a moment of existential crisis by many Greek states – their way of living and institutions were under threat from a foreign enemy, and so there was a dire need to put aside their long-held differences and join forces to protect their homelands. Arguably, the driving factor behind the emergence of the panhellenic ideal was the “othering” of the Persians. This is best illustrated in Herodotos’ work, where he often makes an effort to differentiate between the Greeks and the Persians. 

According to Herodotos’ account of the Battle of Salamis, the Persian soldier is “spurred on by his fear of Xerxes, and each of them imagined that the king’s eyes were on him” (Herodotos, 8.86). This line points to the “rule by fear” that is associated with the Persians. While the Greeks fight to protect their homes and way of life, the Persians are fighting lest they anger their king. Another example of this stereotyping is the conversation between the Persian satrap Hydarnes and two Spartans named Sperthias and Bulis. The Spartans are asked by Hydarnes why they wouldn’t submit to the Persian king and live a life of luxury and prestige. They respond that Hydarnes only knew what it was to be a slave. Yet if he tasted freedom, he would encourage the Spartans to fight even harder for it (Herodotos, 7.135.3).

The Persians are depicted as slavish, materialistic, and having a lust for power. But the Greeks are courageous, lawful, and value freedom and autonomy. It is this differentiation that acted as a catalyst for panhellenism in the 5th century, as it further delineated Greek identity, and established a common enemy that the Greeks could unite against. However, we should not fall for the mirage of a unified Greece versus Persia. The reality was that only a relative handful of city-states rose up in rebellion against the Persians. The majority of Greeks decided to side (“Medize”) with Persia, seeing opportunities for trade and security. “Panhellenism” implies unity, yet even among those Greek states that did fight the Persians, there was anything but unity.

A good example of disunity is the Battle of Salamis. Prior to the battle, there was hot debate amongst the Greeks if they should fight the Persians or not. The Spartans were not interested at all in fighting for a country that appeared to have already been lost. They preferred to hunker down in the Peloponnese, separated from the rest of Greece (Herodotos, 8.74). Another example of disunity is the Battle of Thermopylae. Initially, the Spartans were accompanied by 6,000 other Greeks. But eventually, only 700 men from the Boietian city of Thespiai and some Thebans were left after the bulk of the army abandoned the effort. The Persian Wars problematize panhellenism, instead of providing a coherent picture of it (Kowalzig, Week 9.2 Slideshow). It seems the Greeks united out of necessity, and would go back to fighting each other once the war was over (and they did). 

The Greeks during the Peloponnesian War were far from united, with Athens and Sparta both trying to vie for dominance. And it was during the Peloponnesian War that panhellenism began to be used as a justification and “cover-up” for the imperial and hegemonic ambitions of city-states in the name of defence. The prime example here is Athens. Following the Battle of Mycale, the Athenians along with their allies founded the “Delian League” in 477 BCE with the purpose, or pretext, of continuing the war against the Persians. Panhellenism emerged out of the “othering” of the Persians, and we can see how it has become inextricably linked with the “Persian threat”. Athens, as the most powerful of all the members, would take up its position as the leader of the league and subsequently pursued a very imperialistic foreign policy. It would secure access to the Hellespont and Black Sea, control the grain route, and take over the gold and silver mines in Thrace. It was common for Athens to establish colonies or cleruchies to affirm its dominance, appropriate funds from allies, interfere in the politics of other city-states, and put down rebellions from members trying to leave. The Delian League began with the panhellenic goal of defence against the Persians, yet it eventually turned into the “Athenian Empire”. 

Panhellenism was certainly a driving factor behind the rise of the Macedonians. The Macedonians were not considered Greek – they were “shepherds and cow-herders” from the backwater northern frontier. To combat this perception, it was Phillip II who appealed to certain panhellenic points. Following the Third Sacred War, which saw Macedonia side with the Amphictyonic League, Phillip was actually granted a seat on the Amphictyonic council. Given the council’s status as the “UN of Greece”, this allowed Phillip to better pose as someone acting on behalf of all the Greeks. After the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, he commissioned the Philippeion, a marble and limestone tholos, at Olympia, one of the greatest panhellenic sanctuaries. The activities at Olympia, notably the Olympic Games, were restricted to Greeks only. As such, the Philippeion was not only a monument to a Macedonian victory, but a confirmation of Macedonia’s Hellenicity. 

Soon after in 337 BCE, Phillip founded the Corinthian League, with the official purpose of leading a panhellenic crusade against the Persians to punish them for their invasions of Greece. His efforts were certainly encouraged by orators like Isocrates, who wanted Phillip to “spearhead the concord of Greece and the campaign against the barbarian” (Isocrates 5, To Phillip, 16). Of course, Phillip’s true intention was to conquer and establish his own empire, as Polybios explains (Polybios, The Histories, 3.6). Alexander would usurp Phillip’s mission, and there are many instances in Alexander’s campaigns that speak to his panhellenic program. It is interesting that Alexander’s first destination in his invasion of the Persian Empire was Troy, perhaps mirroring Agamemnon’s panhellenic campaign. It is also notable that Alexander, in his letter to Darius (as given by Arrian), presented himself as the leader of the Greeks, not the Macedonians – “I have been appointed hegemon of the Greeks…” (Arrian, 2.14). And according to Plutarch, during Alexander’s pre-battle speech to his troops at Gaugamela, he prayed to the gods and called on them to “defend and strengthen the Greeks” (Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 33.1). With the Macedonians, we see panhellenism being used not only as a justification for imperial ambitions, but as a way to affirm one’s Greek identity. And again, the “Persian threat” is being used as a way to garner panhellenic support.

To conclude, panhellenism was indeed a driving force of Greek history during this period, where it was used to build a defence against a common enemy, or for city-states and kingdoms to advance their own imperial agendas. The reality was not a truly unified Greece, but instead a “politics” of panhellenism (Kowalzig). And it is also vital to understand that panhellenism was powerful only insofar as the Persians were perceived to be a real threat. We see this in the Persian Wars, Athens’ imperial project, and the rise of Phillip and Alexander. Without external compulsion in the form of Persia, it is hard to see how panhellenic sentiments could have otherwise developed and persisted given the chronic parochialism of the Greek city-states.